Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 2 Spring

Article 9

Coaches' Contracts: Terminating A Coach
Without Cause and the Obligation to Mitigate
Damages
Martin J. Greenberg
Djenane Paul

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Martin J. Greenberg and Djenane Paul, Coaches' Contracts: Terminating A Coach Without Cause and the Obligation to Mitigate Damages,
23 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 339 (2013)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol23/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

GREENBERG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

5/7/2013 2:32 PM

ARTICLES

COACHES’ CONTRACTS: TERMINATING A
COACH WITHOUT CAUSE AND THE
OBLIGATION TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
MARTIN J. GREENBERG & DJENANE PAUL
I. INTRODUCTION
A divorce in college athletics can be expensive. Sometimes the
relationship between a university and its coach just does not work out, and the
university ends it. However, when terminating a coach without cause, a
university may also incur enormous fiscal obligations to pay for the coach’s
remaining contract years. Nowadays, a coach can depart from his or her
former institution with over a million dollar payday still pending due to
careless contract drafting.
Recently, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign went through a
very expensive divorce in college athletics. By the end of the 2011–2012
football and basketball seasons, the university experienced the early
termination of Ron Zook, Bruce Weber, and Jolette Law—the head coaches of
its football, men’s basketball, and women’s basketball teams, respectively.1
The timing of the terminations created tremendous financial liability in the
university’s budget and on its books due to the continued obligation to pay
each of these coaches their expected contractual salary—a total of $7.1
million.2 After termination, the university owed $2.6 million to Ron Zook for
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1. Chad Thornburg, Coaching Buyouts Cost DIA $7.1 Million in Remaining Salaries, THE
DAILY ILLINI (Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.dailyillini.com/salary_guide/article_046c0816-2180-11e2a41b-001a4bcf6878.html.
2. Id.
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the 2 years remaining on his contract, $3.9 million to Bruce Weber for his
final 3 years, and $620,000 to Jolette Law for her last 2 contract years.3 In
addition to these generous paydays, each of these coaches found employment
relatively quickly: Ron Zook is sitting in a broadcast booth for CBS, Bruce
Weber traded in his orange ties for purple as he now strolls the sidelines as
Kansas State’s head men’s basketball coach, and Jolette Law serves as an
assistant basketball coach for the University of Tennessee Lady Volunteers.4
However, had the university drafted careful mitigation of damages clauses into
these contracts, it could have avoided its costly financial burden.
On the other hand, in the Southeastern Conference (SEC), universities are
not typically financially burdened by the simultaneous firing of high profile
coaches; rather, they suffer from a win at all costs mentality in football. An
SEC team has won the last seven national championships in college football,
and the conference will likely continue to succeed with its teams boasting
eleven of the top twenty-five recruiting classes for 2013.5 To achieve this
continued level of success, universities in the SEC spend exorbitant amounts
of money to attract the top college football coaches.6 However, according to
some, “[t]he latest symbol of the college football arms race is not the coaches’
salaries themselves but rather the money that university officials are spending
to buy out those huge contracts when a coach falters.”7 Within the last two
years, five SEC teams terminated their coaches with years remaining on their
contracts and, consequently, these institutions owe almost $27 million in
buyouts.8
Because the stakes are high, an understanding of the legal and monetary
implications of an early firing is essential to not only a coach’s representative
but to university counsel as well. This Article will provide practical insights
into how an institution may prepare to protect itself through careful contract
drafting from incurring the costs associated with the early termination of its
highly paid athletics coaches. Section II first surveys numerous collegiate
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Dan Wolken, FACT: The SEC Rules College Football . . . so Notre Dame, What’re You
Gonna Do About It?, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2012, at 1A; Clark Spencer, SEC Team BCS Title for
Seventh Consecutive Season, THE MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/
01/08/3172217/sec-teams-bcs-title-for-seventh.html.
6. Wolken, supra note 5 (“According to USA Today Sports’ most recent annual analysis, SEC
schools account for nine of the [twenty] largest athletic budgets in the country and seven of the
[twenty] highest-paid coaches.”).
7. Jeré Longman, Firing a Coach, at a Price, with Little Evidence the Move Pays off, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2012, at A1.
8. Dan Wolken, In SEC, Money Follows Coaches out Door, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2012, at
1C.
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coaching contracts to identify the various terms that termination without cause
provisions may include. Section III then offers some best practices that
institutions should follow when drafting termination without cause provisions.
Next, Section IV explains the legal principles behind the affirmative duty to
mitigate damages in the employment law context. Section V applies these
general principles to drafting effective mitigation of damages provisions in
college coaching contracts. Section VI then explores the practical difficulties
in dealing with such provisions based on personal experiences. Lessons
learned from these experiences are incorporated into Section VII, which
suggests several best practices with regard to mitigation of damages that
should be taken into consideration when drafting coaching contracts. Finally,
Section VIII concludes with some final thoughts as to the importance of
careful drafting in collegiate athletics.
II. TERMINATION WITHOUT CAUSE
In the world of college coaching, the contractual concept of mitigation of
damages has found its way into coaches’ contracts under what is normally
called “termination without cause.”9 In most contracts the university has the
right at any time to terminate the coach’s contract without cause or reason and
for the university’s own convenience prior to its normal expiration.
Termination without cause is best defined as a premature termination of a
contract prior to the end term date, and it normally involves payment of
compensation to the coach who was prematurely terminated.10
Termination without cause usually involves a failure by the coach to win,
lagging ticket sales, dwindling attendance, unhappiness among big money
donors, loss of interest in the program, inability to compete in a conference or
against a rival opponent, changes in administration (e.g., the athletic director
or the president), or any other cause not listed in the termination for cause
contractual provision.11
In order to understand the mitigation of damages concept, one must first
analyze what might be included in a termination without cause provision in a
college coaching contract. In evaluating what is included in a termination
without cause provision, it is important to review a cross section of those
provisions as contained in current coaching contracts as well as some contracts
of coaches that either recently retired, resigned, or were terminated.
9. Martin J. Greenberg, Termination of College Coaching Contracts: When Does Adequate
Cause to Terminate Exist and Who Determines Its Existence?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 197, 205
(2006).
10. Id. at 205–07.
11. Id. at 205.
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A termination without cause provision will contain some of the following
elements: written notice of termination, payment format, payments constitute
liquidated damages, waiver and release of liability, no continuation of benefits,
withholding, interest, reassignment, death or disability, no liability for
collateral benefits, records returns, no obligation to mitigate, limitation on
amount, and resignation considered termination without cause.
1. Written Notice of Termination. In order to terminate a coach prior to
the end term of a contract that includes a termination without cause provision,
the university is required to give oral or written notice of its intent to terminate
and the date upon which the termination becomes effective. Several examples
follow:
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “Termination by the University
without cause shall be effectuated by delivering to the Employee
written notice of the University’s intent to terminate this Contract
without cause, which notice shall be effective upon the earlier of
the date for termination specified in the notice or fourteen (14)
days after receipt of such notice by the Employee.”12
o CALIPARI - University of Kentucky: “Termination by the
University without Cause shall be effectuated by delivering
written notice not less than thirty days prior to the effective date of
said termination. Termination shall be effective upon the date
specified in the notice.”13
o MILES - Louisiana State University (LSU): “The UNIVERSITY
shall have the right to terminate this Agreement without cause at
any time by giving COACH thirty (30) days prior written
notice.”14
o PELINI - University of Nebraska: “The parties agree that the
University shall, at any time, have the right to terminate Coach’s
employment hereunder for reasons other than for cause upon
giving Coach reasonable written or verbal notice of termination,
as such reasonableness may be determined by the University in its
discretion and exercise of good faith.”15

12. Amendment to Coaching Contract between Nick L. Saban and Univ. of Ala. ¶ 5.01(d) (Jan.
4, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Saban Contract].
13. Coaching Contract between John Vincent Calipari and Univ. of Ky. ¶ 7(b) (Mar. 31, 2009)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Calipari Contract].
14. Amendment to Coaching Contract between Les Miles and La. State Univ.¶ 13(A) (Dec. 7,
2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2007 Miles Amendment].
15. Coaching Contract between Mark “Bo” Pelini and Univ. of Neb.-Lincoln ¶ 14(a) (Mar. 1,
2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pelini Contract].
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2. Payment Amount and Format. A termination without cause provision
will specify the amount the coach is to receive and the timing of the payments
to be received. Some examples follow:
o CREAN - Indiana University: “[T]he University’s sole obligation
to the employee shall be to continue to pay the Employee an
amount representing the lesser of his then-current base annual
salary . . . for the remainder of the Agreement, or Three Million
Dollars ($3,000,000). [I]rrespective of the total sum to be paid,
this amount will be payable in monthly installments . . . .”16
o MILLER - University of Arizona: “University shall pay to Coach
. . . an amount equal to one-half of the sum of his then-current
annual Program Salary . . . and Related Compensation . . . for the
remainder of the Contract Year in which such termination
occurred plus (i) $4.8 million if the termination occurred in the
first Contract Year, (ii) $4.0 million if the termination occurred in
the second Contract Year; (iii) $3.2 million if the termination
occurred in the third Contract Year, or (iv) $1.6 million if the
termination occurred in the [f]ourth Contract Year.
In the event of such termination after the fourth Contract
Year, University shall pay to Coach . . . an amount equal to onehalf of the sum of his then-current annual Program Salary . . . and
Related Compensation . . . per year, multiplied by the number of
full and fractional years remaining on the Term.”17
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “[T]he University shall pay,
and Employee agrees to accept . . . an amount equal to the sum of
annual base salary and talent fees for each month remaining on the
term of the Contract calculated from the first full month
immediately following the effective date of termination without
cause . . . . The [amount] shall be paid to Employee over a period
of time equal to twice the number of full months remaining on the
Contract term (the “Payment Period”) in monthly installments
commencing on the last day of the month immediately following
the month in which the termination date occurs and continuing on
the last day of each succeeding month thereafter during the
Payment Period.”18

16. Coaching Contract between Thomas Crean and Ind. Univ. ¶ 6.02(f) (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Crean Contract].
17. Coaching Contract between Sean E. Miller and Univ. of Ariz. ¶ 18 (June 22, 2009) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Miller Contract].
18. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(e).
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SELF - University of Kansas: “[University] shall pay Head Coach
as liquidated damages, the remaining amount owed to Head Coach
[for salary and professional services] for the balance of the
contract period as well as all payments as provided for under the
terms of . . . the Retention Agreement . . . .”19
MONTGOMERY - University of California: “UNIVERSITY
shall pay to Coach as liquidated damages, in lieu of any and all
other legal remedies or equitable relief, the following sum(s):
100% of the salary and talent fee for the remainder of the
twelve month period in which the termination without
cause occurs; and
100% of the next remaining year’s base salary and talent
fee; and
75% of the next remaining year’s base salary and talent
fee; and
50% of the next remaining year’s base salary and talent
fee; and
25% of the base salary and talent fee for each of the next
remaining contract years.”20
RYAN - University of Wisconsin: “University shall pay to Coach
. . . an amount equal to Coach’s then current Contracted Salary, as
defined in paragraph III. B. of this Agreement, for the period of
four (4) years from the effective date of the termination or for the
remainder of the Term, including any extension thereof,
whichever amount is less. University’s obligation shall be paid on
a monthly basis, prorated over the balance of the Term of this
Agreement. In the alternative and within University’s sole
discretion, University may pay to Coach a lump sum equal to the
total monthly payments otherwise due hereunder, discounted to an
equivalent net present value using the short-term Applicable
Federal Rate under Internal Revenue Code §1274(d), annual
compounding, as of the end of the month immediately preceding
the date of termination.”21
STOOPS - University of Oklahoma: “The parties to this Contract

19. Coaching Contract between Bill Self and Univ. of Kan. ¶ 12 (Apr. 1, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Self Contract].
20. Coaching Contract between Michael Montgomery and Univ. of Cal. ¶ 12 (Apr. 5, 2008) (on
file with author) [hereinafter 2008 Montgomery Contract].
21. Amendment to Coaching Contract between William F. Ryan Jr. & Univ. of Wis.-Madison ¶
V(A)(3) (July 1, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ryan Contract].
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agree that in the event of a termination without cause under
Paragraph V.A. of this Contract the damages incurred by Coach
would be uncertain and not susceptible to exact computation.
Accordingly, in the event of a termination without cause under
Paragraph V.A., the University will pay Coach Three Million
Dollars ($3,000,000) per year remaining under the term as set
forth in Paragraph II.A. Such amount would be paid in annual
installments each year commencing within 30 days of termination.
Such annual amount shall be prorated for any termination prior to
the end of a contract year. By agreeing to this Contract, Coach
agrees that this amount will constitute full settlement of any and
all claims that Coach might otherwise assert against the University
and any of its agents or employees. If Coach asserts any claim
against the University in violation of this Paragraph V.B., the
University is released from any and all obligations to make
payments to Coach under this Paragraph V.B. from the date the
claim is asserted to any entity, including the press, any agency, or
a court.”22
3. Payments Constitute Liquidated Damages. Drafters of employment
contracts often include provisions that will specify the damages for a breach.
“A provision in a written employment agreement that stipulates the amount of
money to be recovered if the employee is discharged, is known as a liquidated
damage clause.”23 “Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in
the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach. . . .”24
Liquidated damage clauses present several contractual advantages. First,
they establish some predictability involving costs so that parties can balance
the cost of anticipated performance against the cost of a breach.25 In this way
liquidated damages serve as a source of limited insurance for both parties.
Another contractual advantage of liquidated damage clauses is that the parties
each have the opportunity to settle on a sum that is mutually agreeable rather
than leaving that decision up to the courts or arbitrators.26
There is a presumption in favor of the validity of liquidated damage

22. Coaching Contract between Robert Anthony Stoops and Univ. of Okla. ¶ V(B) (Jan. 1,
2009) (on file with author).
23. PAUL H. TOBIAS, 2 LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 8:4 (2012).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981).
25. What Are “Liquidated Damages”?, ROTTENSTEIN LAW GROUP LLP, http://www.rotlaw.
com/legal-library/what-are-liquidated-damages/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
26. See id.

GREENBERG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

346

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

5/7/2013 2:32 PM

[Vol. 23:2

provisions.27 Thus, the burden is on the party opposing its validity to
demonstrate that it is invalid and unenforceable.28
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that the liquidated damages
clause is enforceable “only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the
anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of
loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable
on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”29 Further, it has been found that if
the sum to be paid to the discharged employee is paid in accordance with the
time in which the employment contract is expected to run, the liquidated
damages provision for payment will be readily upheld.30
The case of Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo dealt with a liquidated
damage clause in the event that DiNardo terminated his contract or resigned
his coaching duties before the expiration of the contract.31 Vanderbilt brought
an action to collect liquidated damages under a buyout provision.32 DiNardo
claimed that the liquidated damages portion of the contract was an
unenforceable penalty under Tennessee law and that the liquidated damage
provision was a ‘“thinly disguised, overly broad non-compete provision,’
unenforceable under Tennessee law.”33
Although this case involved a liquidated damage clause when a coach
decided to terminate his contract early, the Sixth Circuit, using the same
standard as the district court, disagreed with DiNardo’s contentions:
Contracting parties may agree to the payment of liquidated
damages in the event of a breach. The term “liquidated
damages” refers to an amount determined by the parties to be
just compensation for damages should a breach occur. Courts
will not enforce such a provision, however, if the stipulated
amount constitutes a penalty. A penalty is designed to coerce
performance by punishing default. In Tennessee, a provision
will be considered one for liquidated damages, rather than a
penalty, if it is reasonable in relation to the anticipated
damages for breach, measured prospectively at the time the
contract was entered into, and not grossly disproportionate to
the actual damages.
When these conditions are met,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

NPS, LLC v. Minihane, 886 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Mass. 2008).
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1).
See Anderson v. Cactus Heights Country Club, 125 N.W.2d 491, 493–94 (S.D. 1963).
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 174 F.3d 751, 753 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 755.
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particularly the first, the parties probably intended the
provision to be for liquidated damages. However, any doubt
as to the character of the contract provision will be resolved in
favor of finding it a penalty.34
The district court concluded that a “formula based on DiNardo’s salary to
calculate liquidated damages was reasonable ‘given the nature of the
unquantifiable damages in the case’” and that “parties to a contract may
include consequential damages and even damages not usually awarded by law
in a liquidated damage provision provided that they were contemplated by the
parties.”35 The district court further explained that
The potential damage to [Vanderbilt] extends far beyond the
cost of merely hiring a new head football coach. It is this
uncertain potentiality that the parties sought to address by
providing for a sum certain to apply towards anticipated
expenses and losses. It is impossible to estimate how the loss
of a head football coach will affect alumni relations, public
support, football ticket sales, contributions, etc. . . . As such,
to require a precise formula for calculating damages resulting
from the breach of contract by a college head football coach
would be tantamount to barring the parties from stipulating to
liquidated damages evidence in advance.36
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court and concluded that the
stipulated damage amount was reasonable in relation to the amount of damage
that could be expected to result from the breach.37 The court also found that
the parties understood that Vanderbilt would suffer damage should DiNardo
prematurely terminate his contract, and that these actual damages would be
difficult to measure.38
As a general rule, if a court upholds a liquidated damages provision, the
injured party may not seek compensatory damages. 39 However, “[u]nless a
contract provides that liquidated damages are to be the exclusive remedy for a
breach, a liquidated damages provision does not preclude other relief to the
non-breaching party, if the actual damages are caused by an event not

34.
35.
1997)).
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 755–56 (quoting Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo, 974 F. Supp. 638, 642 (M.D. Tenn.
Vanderbilt, 974 F. Supp. at 642.
Vanderbilt, 174 F.3d at 757
Id.
See Harris v. Conrad, No. 7251, 1984 WL 21876, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 1984).
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contemplated by the parties in the liquidated damages clause.”40
In order for a plaintiff to establish a breach of contract action for the
recovery of liquidated damages, two requirements must be met.41 First, the
amount that was agreed upon by the parties must be a reasonable estimation of
compensatory damages in the event of a breach; second, the damages for a
contractual breach must have been difficult to determine at the time the
contract was formed.42 If the two requirements are met, the plaintiff is entitled
to receive liquidated damages even if no actual money or pecuniary damages
were suffered.43 If a court finds that the sum that was stipulated is not
rationally related to the measure of damages that the injured party may have
sustained as a result of a breach, a liquidated damages provision will be
deemed a penalty and subsequently struck down for violating public policy.44
The coach and university will stipulate that the payments received for
termination without cause are agreed upon payments that constitute liquidated
damages, are not a penalty, were bargained for at arm’s length between the
parties, and were reasonable. Several examples include:
o WILLIAMS - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: “The
parties have bargained for this liquidated damages provision,
giving consideration to the following: (a) this is an agreement for
personal services; and (b) the parties recognize that a termination
of this Agreement by UNIVERSITY prior to its natural expiration
could cause COACH to lose benefits, compensation, and/or
outside compensation relating to his employment at
UNIVERSITY, which damages are difficult to determine with
certainty. Therefore, the parties have agreed upon this liquidated
damages provision.”45

40. Draper v. Westwood Dev. Partners, No. CIV. A. 4428–MG, 2010 WL 2432896, at *3 (Del.
Ch. June 3, 2010; revised June 16, 2010) (citation omitted).
41. See JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 467–68 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the liquidated damages clause was enforceable because the damages were difficult to
ascertain at the time the agreement was entered into and the amount agreed upon was “not plainly
disproportionate to the injury”).
42. See Guthy-Renker Corp. v. Bernstein, 39 F. App’x 584, 586 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
under California law “[a] liquidated damages clause will be . . . unenforceable . . . ‘if it bears no
reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would
flow from a breach.’”) (quoting Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Ass’n, 953 P.2d 484, 488 (Cal.
1998)).
43. See id.
44. See S.H. Deliveries, Inc. v. TriState Courier & Carriage, Inc., No. 96C-02-086-WTQ, 1997
WL 817883, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 1997) (citing 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 683 (1965));
Meyer Ventures, Inc. v. Barnak, No. 11502, 1990 WL 172648, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 1990).
45. Amendment to Coaching Contract between Roy A. Williams and Univ. of N.C. at Chapel
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SABAN - University of Alabama: “The parties have bargained for
and agreed to the foregoing liquidated damages provision, giving
consideration to the fact that termination of this Contract by the
University without cause prior to its expiration may cause the
Employee to lose certain benefits and incentives, supplemental
compensation, or other athletically-related compensation
associated with Employee’s employment at the University, which
damages are extremely difficult to determine with certainty or
fairly or adequately. The parties further agree that the payment of
such Liquidated Damages by the University and acceptance
thereof by the Employee shall constitute adequate and reasonable
compensation to the Employee for the damages and injuries
suffered by the Employee because of such termination by the
University. The foregoing shall not be, nor be construed to be, a
penalty.”46
o KELLY - University of Oregon (contract terminated by coach):
“The parties have bargained for and agreed to the foregoing
liquidated damages provisions giving consideration to the fact that
termination of this Agreement or any extension thereof by
University without cause prior to such agreement’s expiration date
may precipitate or lead to Kelly losing certain salary, benefits,
compensation or other economic advantages or income related to
his employment at the University, which damages are extremely
difficult to determine fairly, adequately, or with certainty. The
parties further agree that the payment of such liquidated damages
by University and acceptance thereof by Kelly shall constitute
sufficient, adequate and reasonable compensation to Kelly for any
loss, damages or injury suffered by Kelly related to such
termination by University. The foregoing shall not be, nor be
construed to be, a penalty. The provisions of this Section 6.02
shall be without prejudice to any other right (excluding
unemployment compensation) Kelly may have under applicable
law.”47
4. Waiver and Release of Liability. Upon the conclusion of the payment
of the amount agreed to as liquidated damages, the coach will release the
university from any and all further damages. Several examples include:
o

Hill ¶ XI (Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with author).
46. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(e).
47. Coaching Contract between Charles “Chip” Kelly and Univ. of Or. ¶ 6.02(b) (Sept. 27,
2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kelly Contract].
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SABAN - University of Alabama: “University shall have no
liability whatsoever to Employee, nor shall Employee be entitled
to receive, and Employee hereby waives any claim that Employee
or Employee’s personal representatives may have against the
University or the University’s trustees, officers, employees, or
agents, for any direct or consequential damages . . . .”48
PELINI - University of Nebraska: “Upon payment of such
liquidated damages to Coach, Coach does hereby waive and
release the University, its Board members, administrators,
employees and agents, from any and all claims of any nature
whatsoever, which may arise by reason of such termination,
including, but not limited to any benefits of employment or other
income which may accrue to Coach by reason of Coach’s position
as Head Football Coach.”49
CREAN - Indiana University: “The Employee agrees that as a
condition of receiving any post termination compensation under
Section 6.02:1, except for earned but unpaid compensation to the
date of termination and any legally protected rights the Employee
has under any employee benefit plan, the Employee must execute
a comprehensive release in the form determined from time to time
by the University in its sole discretion[.] Generally, the release
will require the University, the Employee (and his estate),
administrators, successors, heirs, distributees, devisees, legatees
and assigns to release and forever discharge the University and its
trustees, officers,[] directors, agents, attorney, successors and
assigns from any and all claims, suits and/or causes of action that
grow out of or are in any way related to[] the Employee’s
employment with the University. This release may include but
shall not be limited to any claim that the University violated the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Older Worker’s
Benefit Protection Act; the Americans with Disabilities Act; Title
VTI of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 (as amended); the Family and
Medical Leave Act; any state, federal law or local ordinance
prohibiting discrimination, harassment or retaliation in
employment; any claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, claims of promissory estoppel or detrimental
reliance, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress;
breach of contract; the public policy of any state; or any federal,

48. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(f).
49. Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 14(c).
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state or local law relating to any matter contemplated by this
Agreement[.]
Upon termination of employment with the
University, the Employee will be presented with a release and, if
the Employee fails to execute the release, the Employee agrees to
forfeit any payment from the University.
The Employee
acknowledges that he is an experienced person knowledgeable
about the claims that might arise in the course of employment
with the University and knowingly agrees that the payments upon
termination provided for in this Agreement are satisfactory
consideration for the release of all possible claims described in the
release.”50
HOWLAND - University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
(terminated): “Coach’s right to payment under this Paragraph 12
is subject to the express understanding that Coach shall bring no
claim or lawsuit of any kind against University or its employees or
agents which arises out of or is in any way related to termination
of his employment under this Paragraph 12, or his employment
(except any claim for worker’s compensation or enforcement of
Coach’s right to payment under this Paragraph 12), regardless of
when such termination may take place. In the event that Coach
brings such a claim or lawsuit, all obligations of University under
this Paragraph 12 shall cease, and Coach shall repay, forthwith
and in full, any and all post-termination payments received by him
from University under this Paragraph 12[.]”51
DONOVAN - University of Florida: “Coach . . . hereby waives
any claim . . . for consequential damages allegedly sustained by
reason of any alleged economic loss, including, without limitation,
loss of collateral income, loss of earning capacity, loss of business
opportunity, loss of perquisites, loss of speech, camp or other
outside activity fees, or expectation income, or damages allegedly
sustained by or by reason of alleged humiliation or defamation
resulting from the fact of termination or suspension, the public
announcement thereof or the release by Association, University or
Coach of information or documents required to be released by
law. Coach acknowledges that in the event of termination of this
Agreement for cause, without cause or otherwise, or suspension
hereunder, he shall have no right to occupy the position of head

50. Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(H).
51. Coaching Contract between Ben Howland and Univ. of Cal., L.A. ¶ 12(d) (June 1, 2008)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Howland Contract].
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basketball Coach and that his sole remedies are provided herein
and shall not extend to injunctive relief.
Coach further
acknowledges that he has no expectation of the granting of tenure
by University.”52
o CHIZIK - Auburn University (terminated): “Coach acknowledges
that in the event of termination of this Agreement he shall have no
right to occupy the position of Head Football Coach and that his
sole remedies are provided herein and shall not extend to
injunctive relief. Coach acknowledges that he has no expectation
of tenure. Coach acknowledges that as part of this Agreement, he
forfeits all rights he might have to file a grievance under
University policy related in any way to his termination, and
University acknowledges that it will not assert in subsequent
proceedings that Coach’s forfeiture of these rights results in his
failure to exhaust any administrative remedies.”53
5. Continuation of Benefits. A termination without cause provision
makes clear that the only amounts that the coach is entitled to receive are those
amounts specifically enumerated as liquidated damages. University benefits,
with some exception, normally will cease upon the payment of liquidation of
damages.54 Some examples follow:
o HOWLAND - UCLA (terminated): “Coach understands and
agrees that any payments made to him as a result of a Termination
Without Cause shall not entitle him to the continuation of
University employee benefits, including, without limitation, the
accruing of additional UCRS service credit, except as such
benefits are required by law for former employees, such as
COBRA, or such benefits as shall have vested as of the date of
such termination.”55
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “Employee will be entitled to
continue such life or health insurance benefits at Employee’s own
expense as required or permitted by law . . . .”56
o CALIPARI - University of Kentucky: “Coach will be entitled to
continue such benefits at Coach’s own expense as required or

52. Amendment to Coaching Contract between William J. Donovan and Univ. of Fla.¶ 14(E)
(Apr. 16, 2003) (on file with author).
53. Coaching Contract between Gene Chizik and Auburn Univ. ¶ 20 (Dec. 15, 2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Chizik Contract].
54. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(d).
55. Howland Contract, supra note 51, ¶ 12(e).
56. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(d).
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permitted by law, but Coach will not otherwise be entitled to any
employment or other benefit described herein. Health insurance
however shall continue in full force and effect at University’s
expense for ninety (90) days after date of termination or until
Coach is employed, whichever occurs first.”57
o ERICKSON - Arizona State University (terminated): “All fringe
benefits furnished by the University will terminate on the date of
termination of this Contract.”58
o RYAN - University of Wisconsin: “In either event, Coach will be
entitled to continue his health insurance plan at his own expense
for up to thirty-four (34) months from the effective date of
termination, but will not be entitled to any other employee
benefits, except as otherwise provided herein or required by
applicable law. As permitted by Wisconsin law, Coach may
secure a conversion policy for his UW group term life
insurance.”59
6. Withholding. A termination without cause provision may require the
university to continue to withhold state and federal taxes or other deductions
from the coach’s paycheck in just the same way as though the coach was still
employed. Several examples follow:
o CREAN - Indiana University: “[T]his amount will be payable in
monthly installments with appropriate withholding and deductions
for taxes and other matters required by law.”60
o MILLER - University of Arizona: “The payment by the
University under this section will be subject to such withholdings
as may be required by applicable state and federal laws as
determined by the University.”61
o FISHER - Florida State University: “[T]he University shall pay
Coach . . . , less required deductions and applicable withholdings
for federal, state, and local taxes . . . .”62
7. Interest. While most contracts are silent in this regard, a contract may
specify that no interest will be paid on the accruing liquidated damage

57. Calipari Contract, supra note 13, ¶ 7(b).
58. Coaching Contract between Dennis Erickson and Ariz. State Univ. ¶ 15 (June 11, 2007) (on
file with author).
59. Ryan Contract, supra note 21, ¶ V(A)(3).
60. Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(f).
61. Miller Contract, supra note 17, ¶ 18.
62. Coaching Contract between John J. Fisher, Jr. and Fla. State Univ. ¶ III(A) (Jan. 5, 2010)
(on file with author).
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obligations. Specifically, the contract between the University of Oregon and
Chip Kelly indicated that the university’s obligation shall not accrue interest
so long as the payments are not in arrears or in default.63
8. Reassignment. In some coaches’ contracts, the termination without
cause provision will specify that the university does not have the right to
reassign the coach to any other position in the event of a termination without
cause. Several examples follow:
o PELINI - University of Nebraska: “The position of Head Football
Coach is unique and requires special talents and skills. As such, it
is the only position for which Coach is being employed, and the
University shall not have the right to re-assign Coach to any other
position [in the event that it terminates his contract for reasons
other than for cause].”64
o RHOADS - Iowa State University: “University agrees that it does
not have the power to reassign Rhoads to another position without
his prior written consent.”65
o MCCAFFERY - University of Iowa: “In such event, Coach will
not be reassigned to any other position within the Department of
Athletics.”66
o ROBINSON - Oregon State University: “University waives its
rights to reassign COACH as provided in OAR 580-021-0318.”67
o WALKER - New Mexico State University (contract terminated by
coach): “Head Football Coach agrees that Athletics Director may,
at any time and with reasonable evidence of misconduct without
cause or the necessity of any hearing, reassign Head Football
Coach to other positions with different duties than those as Head
Football Coach of University’s football program, without
reduction in Head Football Coach’s wages and benefits specified
in Section 3 only. Benefits set forth in Section 4, if any, shall
terminate effective upon reassignment unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties. Prior to any reassignment, there shall be a
meeting between the Head Football Coach and the President of the

63. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(b).
64. Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 14(a).
65. Coaching Contract between Paul Rhoads and Iowa State Univ. ¶ V(10), (Dec. 20, 2008) (on
file with author).
66. Coaching Contract between Francis John McCaffery and Univ. of Iowa ¶ 10 (Mar. 29,
2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter McCaffery Contract].
67. Coaching Contract between Craig Robinson and Or. State Univ. ¶ 16 (Apr. 6, 2008) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Robinson Contract].
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University to discuss the matter. After such meeting the President
and Athletics Director shall confer and determine whether a
reassignment shall occur. In the event the decision is made to
reassign Head Football Coach, then the Head Football Coach shall
have the right to accept such reassignment or terminate this
Agreement. Should Head Football Coach decide to terminate this
Agreement, he shall be entitled to receive payment of fifty percent
(50%) of the value of his salary for the remaining term of the
Agreement.”68
9. Death or Disability. Some termination without cause provisions
address the issue as to what happens with respect to liquidated damages
payments in the event that a coach dies or becomes disabled during the period
of payment of liquidated damages and the continued duty and obligation to
mitigate. Some examples follow:
o PELINI - University of Nebraska: “In case of Coach’s death, the
University’s obligations under this section 14 shall cease effective
on the last day of the month in which Coach dies.”69
o LONDON - University of Virginia: “No payment shall be payable
following the Coach’s death or during a period of any
incarceration or other condition precluding the Coach from
actively seeking to mitigate as above provided.”70
o RYAN - University of Wisconsin: “If University terminates this
Agreement without cause pursuant to Article V., Section A.2.(b),
University shall pay to Coach, or to Coach’s estate or designated
beneficiary should Coach die after termination but during the
payment period, as liquidated damages . . . .”71
10. No Liability for Collateral Benefits. Oftentimes, a termination
without cause provision will indicate that the amounts stated as liquidated
damages are the only amounts that the coach will receive. As a result, the
coach will receive no other collateral benefits as provided in the contract.
Several examples follow:
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “University shall have no
liability whatsoever to Employee, nor shall Employee be entitled
to receive, and Employee hereby waives any claim that Employee
68. Coaching Contract between DeWayne Walker and N.M. State Univ. ¶ 14 (Jan. 1, 2009) (on
file with author).
69. Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 14(a).
70. Coaching Contract between Mike London and Univ. of Va. ¶ 7.3(2) (Dec 8, 2009) (on file
with author) [hereinafter London Contract].
71. Ryan Contract, supra note 21, ¶ V(A)(3).
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or Employee’s personal representatives may have against the
University or the University’s trustees, officers, employees, or
agents, for any direct or consequential damages by reason of any
alleged economic loss, including, but without limitation, loss of
collateral income, talent fees, earning capacity, business
opportunities, incentive and supplemental income, benefits, or
perquisites, including those described in Sections 4.02 and 4.03
hereof, or Commercial Activities income or fees or by reason of
alleged humiliation or defamation resulting from the fact of
termination or suspension, the public announcement thereof, or
the University’s release of information or documents required by
law. Employee acknowledges that in the event of the termination
of this Contract for cause, without cause, or otherwise, Employee
shall have no right to occupy the position of head football coach
and Employee’s sole remedies are provided for herein and shall
not extend to injunctive relief.”72
CREAN - Indiana University: “In addition, in no case shall the
University be liable to the Employee for the loss of any collateral
business opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites or income
resulting from activities such as but not limited to camps, clinics,
media appearances, radio, television, Internet, marketing and
promotional services, apparel or shoo [sic] contracts, basketball or
equipment agreements, consulting relationships or from[] other
sources that might produce promotional or outside income[.]”73
KELLY - University of Oregon (contract terminated by coach):
“In no case shall University or the State of Oregon be liable for
the loss of any collateral business opportunities or any other
benefits (including unemployment compensation), or perquisites
or income resulting from activities such as but not limited to,
camps, clinics, media appearances, broadcast talent fees,
consulting relationships or from any other (inside-the-University
or outside-the-University) sources that may ensue as a result of
University’s termination of this Agreement without cause.”74
HOKE - University of Michigan: “In no case shall the University
be liable for the loss of any base salary, additional compensation,
bonus payments, deferred compensation, collateral business
opportunities or any other benefits, perquisites or income resulting

72. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(f).
73. Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(I).
74. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(b).
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from activities such as, but not limited to, camps, clinics, media
appearances, television or radio shows, apparel or shoe contracts,
consulting relationships or from any other sources that may ensue
as a result of the University’s termination without cause of Head
Coach’s employment under this Agreement.”75
o GOTTFRIED - North Carolina State University (NC State): “In
the event NC STATE exercises its right to terminate the
Agreement without Cause, NC STATE shall not be obligated to
pay COACH any other compensation described in the Agreement
(except as detailed to the contrary herein) or be responsible for
consequential damages, including, but not limited to any loss of
business opportunities or loss of other income, benefits, or
perquisites from any sources, that might occur as a result of such
termination.”76
11. Records Return. With this provision, the coach, upon termination
without cause, is contractually required to return certain records and
information to the university within a designated time period. Some examples
follow:
o MEYER - Ohio State University: “All materials or articles of
information, including, without limitation, personnel records,
recruiting records, Team information, films, statistics or any other
material or data, furnished to Coach by Ohio State or developed
by Coach on behalf of Ohio State or at Ohio State’s direction or
for Ohio State’s use or otherwise in connection with Coach’s
employment hereunder are and shall remain the sole property of
Ohio State. Within seventy-two (72) hours of the expiration of the
term of this agreement or its earlier termination as provided
herein, Coach shall immediately cause any such materials in his
possession or control, including, but not limited to, all Ohio State
building/facility keys, Ohio State issued credit cards, telephones
and computers (including all other Ohio State issued technological
devices) to be delivered to Ohio State.”77
o PELINI - University of Nebraska: “All documents, files, records,
materials (in any format, including electronically stored

75. Coaching Contract between Brady Hoke and Univ. of Mich. ¶ 4.01(d) (Mar. 28, 2011) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Hoke Contract].
76. Coaching Contract between Mark Gottfried and N.C. State Univ. ¶ XIII(A) (Apr. 21, 2011)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Gottfried Contract].
77. Coaching Contract between Urban F. Meyer and Ohio State Univ. ¶ 5.4 (Nov. 28, 2011)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Meyer Contract].
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information), equipment or other property, including without
limitation, personnel records, recruiting records, team information,
athletic equipment, films, statistics, keys, credit cards, laptop
computers, software programs, electronic communication devices,
and any other material, data or property, furnished to Coach by the
University or developed or acquired by Coach on behalf of the
University or at the expense of the University or using University
resources or otherwise in connection with Coach’s employment by
the University are and shall remain the sole property of the
University. Within ten (10) days of termination or separation of
Coach’s University employment, for any reason, Coach shall
cause any such materials in Coach’s possession or control to be
delivered to the University. The foregoing provisions of this
section shall not apply to personal notes, personal playbooks,
memorabilia, diaries and similar personal records of Coach, which
Coach is entitled to retain.”78
o FERENTZ - University of Iowa: “All materials or articles of
information including, without limitation, personnel records,
recruiting records, team information, films, statistics or any other
material furnished to the Coach by the University or developed by
the Coach on behalf of the University or at the University’s
direction or for the University’s use or otherwise in connection
with the Coach’s employment hereunder are and shall remain the
property of the University. In the event of the Coach’s
termination as provided herein, the Coach shall immediately cause
any such materials to be delivered to the University.”79
12. No Obligation to Mitigate. Some contracts, upon the acceptance of
amounts stated as liquidated damages, indicate that the coach has absolutely
no further obligation to mitigate. Some examples follow:
o MILLER - University of Arizona: “The amount of liquidated
damages bargained for in this Contract shall not be reduced if
Coach retains other employment.”80
o WHITTINGHAM - University of Utah: “Coach Whittingham
shall have no obligation to mitigate damages if this Agreement is
terminated by the University without cause.”81
78. Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 11.
79. Coaching Contract between Kirk J. Ferentz and Univ. of Iowa ¶ 12 (Feb. 1, 2010) (on file
with author).
80. Miller Contract, supra note 17, ¶ 18.
81. Coaching Contract between Kyle Whittingham and Univ. of Utah ¶ 8(B) (Dec. 29, 2008)
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MCCAFFERY - University of Iowa: “Accordingly, the parties
agree to this liquidated damage provision, and the parties agree
that Coach shall have no duty to mitigate such damages.”82
o HUGGINS - University of West Virginia: “Coach shall have no
duty to mitigate, nor shall University have any right of offset.”83
o PEARL - University of Tennessee (terminated): “If the University
terminates this Agreement pursuant to the terms of this Article
XV(D), the buy-out payments made to Coach Pearl shall not be
subject to mitigation and shall not terminate or be reduced should
Coach Pearl obtain other employment. Coach Pearl shall not be
obligated to obtain other employment.”84
In some contracts, the termination without cause provision will contain a
lump sum buyout, and therefore not require any stipulation that the coach will
mitigate damages. Some examples follow:
o MEYER - Ohio State University:
“Date of Notice of Termination:
Buy-Out Amount*
At any time after contract execution but
on or before January 31, 2014
$15,375,127
Between February 1, 2014 - January 31, 2015
$11,931,731
Between February 1, 2015 - January 31, 2016
$8,683,244
Between February 1, 2016 - January 31, 2017
$5,618,634
Between February 1, 2017 - January 31, 2018
$2,727,492
o

o

Such payment shall be made in a lump sum on the sixtieth (60th)
day after the effective date of termination.”85
JONES - University of Cincinnati (contract terminated by coach):
“The University reserves the right to terminate this Agreement
without cause at any time prior to its expiration by giving Coach
thirty (30) days written notice. In the event the University
terminates this Agreement without cause, it agrees to pay to
Coach, as liquidated damages in full satisfaction of its obligation
to Coach under this Agreement, the following:

(on file with author).
82. McCaffery Contract, supra note 66, ¶ 10.
83. Coaching Contract between Robert E. Huggins and W. Va. Univ. ¶ V(D)(1) (May 1, 2008)
(on file with author).
84. Coaching Contract between Bruce Pearl and Univ. of Tenn. art. XV(D) (Oct. 13, 2005) (on
file with author).
85. Meyer Contract, supra note 77, ¶ 5.2.
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Date of Termination
Liquidated Damages
Before January 31, 2011
$2,500,000
Before January 31, 2012
$2,000,000
Before January 31, 2013
$1,750,000
Before January 31, 2014
$1,500,000
After January 31, 2014
$1,000,000
The appropriate payment will be made within thirty (30) days of
termination.”86
o SELF – University of Kansas: “In the event that Head Coach’s
employment is terminated without cause, [University] shall pay
Head Coach as liquidated damages, the remaining amount owed to
Head Coach under Sections 3 (Salary) and Section 8 (Professional
Services) for the balance of the contract period as well as all
payments as provided for under the terms of Section 4 of the
Retention Agreement dated April 1, 2008 . . . and should be due
and payable within sixty (60) days following Head Coach’s
termination.”87
13. Limitation on Amount. Some termination without cause provisions
will limit the amount of liquidated damages the university is required to pay.
Some examples follow:
o O’LEARY - University of Central Florida: “The Association’s
liability for total payments made to Coach and George O’Leary
Enterprises, Inc. pursuant to Paragraphs 9.2 (A) and (B) above
shall be limited to a maximum cumulative amount of Five Million
Dollars, ($5,000,000), paid as liquidated damages for termination
of this Agreement by the Association without cause. In addition,
no more than $1M[illion] shall be paid to Coach in any single year
after the year of termination.”88
o MILES - LSU: “Upon termination of COACH’S employment
without cause during the term or extended term of this Agreement,
the amount of liquidated damages due COACH shall not exceed
Eighteen Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars
($18,750,000).”89
86. Coaching Contract between Lyle “Butch” Jones and Univ. of Cincinnati ¶ 5(b) (Dec. 16,
2009) (on file with author).
87. Self Contract, supra note 19, ¶ 12.
88. Coaching Contract between George J. O’Leary and Univ. of Cent. Fla. ¶ 9.2(C) (July 1,
2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter O’Leary Contract].
89. Amendment to Coaching Contract between Les Miles and La. State Univ. ¶ 13(A) (Mar.
14, 2008) (on file with author).
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14. Resignation Considered Termination Without Cause. A negotiated
resignation in some instances will be considered a termination without cause:
o STOOPS - University of Arizona (terminated): “[A]t any time
when no grounds exist for termination for cause under Paragraph
17, ‘termination without cause’ shall include a nominal
resignation made under circumstances when the Coach has been
explicitly notified by the Director of Athletics or the President of
the University that he would be terminated if he did not resign;
and such a nominal resignation shall not be considered to be
termination by the Coach under Paragraph 19 [Termination by
Coach] but shall be considered termination by University without
cause and shall be subject to this paragraph 18.”90
Depending on which terms are included and how they are written,
termination without cause provisions may work for or against either a coach or
university. As such, it is necessary to determine the parties’ needs and
expectations to draft the most effective contract.
III. TERMINATION WITHOUT CAUSE: BEST PRACTICES
In reviewing numerous coaches’ contracts, it is apparent what a welldrafted termination without cause provision must contain in order to
adequately answer some of the issues that are necessary to its interpretation
and implementation. These provisions include:
1. Written Notice. The university should give written notice of the
university’s intent to terminate the contract without cause and the effective
date of the termination.
2. Payment Amount and Format. The provision should contain with
specificity the amount and the format in which the coach is to be paid by the
university along with the time frame that such payment should be made. The
provision should also specify the maximum amount the university will pay as
liquidated damages.
3. Liquidated Damages. The university and coach must stipulate that the
amount of liquidated damages was bargained for, agreed to, and does not
constitute a penalty. The contract should also stipulate that the amount
constitutes reasonable and adequate compensation for the damages suffered by
the coach by virtue of said termination without cause.
4. Release. Upon the payment of the contracted amount, the coach should
release, either as part of the contract or by virtue of a separate agreement, the
90. Coaching Contract between Michael Stoops and Univ. of Ariz. ¶ 18 (Dec. 1, 2003) (on file
with author).
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university from any further liability or responsibility.
5. Benefits. The contract should clearly specify which, if any, benefits
provided for by either the university or by the contract continue or cease as a
result of the termination without cause.
6. Withholding. The provision should specify whether the university will
continue to withhold state and federal taxes or other deductions much in the
same way as though the coach was still being paid as if he was an employee.
7. Interest upon Default. The contract provisions should specify what
occurs in the event that the university fails or breaches its obligation. This
provision may include the payment of a specified amount of interest on
accruing obligations, the installment obligations becoming accelerated in the
event of default or breach, and the payment of attorney fees by the university
in the event of a collection action or a lawsuit.
8. Reassignment. The provision should state that the university has no
right to reassign the coach to another position in the event it determines to
terminate the coach without cause.
9. Death or Disability. The contract provision should state with
specificity what occurs in the event the coach either dies or becomes disabled
during the period of payment of liquidated damages and cannot fulfill his
obligation to mitigate damages.
10. Collateral Benefits. The provision should specifically indicate that
liquidated damages are the only damages that the coach will be paid under the
termination without cause provision and that any and all collateral benefits
such as incentives, supplemental income, perquisites, and the like cease to
accrue or be paid upon termination.
11. Records Return. The provision will require the coach to return any
and all documents, files, records, and materials, whether in paper or electronic
format, to the university upon the occurrence of a termination without cause.
12. Resignation. Sometimes the coach and university will negotiate a
resignation as being the public perception of a termination without cause. The
contract should indicate that substance over form will dictate and that the
termination without cause provision will prevail in the event of a resignation.
13. Obligation to Mitigate. The provision may require a lump sum
payment as liquidated damages. If the provision provides for such, it should
indicate that, as a result, the coach has no obligation to mitigate. The coach
may also receive installment payments, and mitigation may not be required; in
this case, and a statement of no obligation should be clearly stated.
When a coach without a contractual obligation to mitigate damages is
terminated before the expiration of his or her contract, the university may be
left with an enormous financial burden. In these instances, the university may
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consider looking to common law mitigation of damages principles for a
solution to its financial woes.
IV. LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR MITIGATION OF DAMAGES IN EMPLOYMENT
CASES
Aside from the high salaries and national prestige of high-profile
collegiate coaches, they are just employees governed by employment law
principles. Thus, an exploration of mitigation of damages principles within
the employment context will help a university understand how to further
protect itself contractually.
A. Definition and Purpose
The doctrine of mitigation of damages, which has been recognized by
every jurisdiction, requires the plaintiff, after an injury or breach of contract,
to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the effects of the injury or breach.91
More specifically, a plaintiff may not recover certain avoidable damages when
he fails to take reasonable actions after an injury occurred.92 The plaintiff is
not required to make extraordinary efforts, which may cause an unreasonable
burden, to ensure no damages are ultimately suffered.93 Efforts that are
undertaken by the non-breaching party to mitigate damages do not need to be
successful as long as they are reasonable.94
The purpose of the doctrine of mitigation of damages is to avoid economic
and physical waste and to avoid further harm by making it incumbent upon the
injured party to take affirmative steps to reduce, avoid, or mitigate his loss.95
The affirmative obligation to mitigate is a condition precedent to receiving
agreed upon damages.96
B. Reasonable Good Faith Efforts
In regard to a breach of an employment contract, an employee who can
establish the fact that he suffered a compensable injury as a result of being
terminated must take reasonable steps to mitigate damages by making
reasonable efforts to obtain and maintain comparable employment.97
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981).
Id. § 350(1) cmt. b.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 350 cmt. a.
See id. § 350 cmt. b.
Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R., 56 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1995).
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There are several factors that may be considered in attempting to
determine if an employee has demonstrated a good faith effort to obtain
comparable employment:
 Did the employee create documentation of all job search activity,
including records of résumés sent, advertisements responded to,
phone logs, mail logs, and employment events attended?98
 Did the employee document all expenses of the job search, which
can be elements in the recovery?99
 Did the employee demonstrate the reasonableness of the scope of
the search?100
 Did the employee expand the types of employment considered as
time passed?101
 Did the employee consult with employment services and
counselors?102
 Did the employee discuss job opportunities with friends and
acquaintances?103
 How much time did the employee devote to the task of finding
comparable employment?104
 What was the availability of comparable positions in the relevant
job market?105
 Did the employee pursue all known comparable employment
opportunities in the relevant job market?106
 How many job applications were submitted by the employee?107
 A decision by the employee to become self-employed.108
However, self-employment must be a “reasonable alternative to
finding other comparable employment.”109

98. See Bannister v. Bemis Co., 556 F.3d 882, 886–87 (8th Cir. 2009).
99. See Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Contract
Remedies, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175, 183 (1996).
100. See Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickman, 885 S.W.2d 256, 263 (Tex. App. 1994).
101. See Hayes v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 844 A.2d 258, 285 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001).
102. See Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 797 (Wash. 2004).
103. See Trainor v. Hei Hospitality, LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 2012).
104. See Hayes, 844 A.2d at 285.
105. See Hertz Equip. Rental Corp. v. Barousse, 365 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tex. App. 2011).
106. See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1995).
107. See Kiely v. Heartland Rehab. Servs., 360 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
108. See Smith v. Great Am. Rests., Inc., 969 F.2d 430, 438 (7th Cir. 1992).
109. See id.
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 A decision by the employee to attend school.110
Idleness will not satisfy the duty to mitigate damages.111 Accordingly,
“‘the reasonableness of the effort [undertaken by the plaintiff] to find
substantially equivalent employment should be evaluated in light of the
individual’s background and experience and the relevant job market.’”112
Currently, employment law does not have a specified duration of time for
which an employee must conduct a job search in order for it to be considered
“reasonably diligent.”113 However, for the purposes of adequately mitigating
damages, the plaintiff should “continue a vigorous search, even if it means
reapplying to employers for jobs that may have opened in the interim
following initial applications, and to document the search with care.”114
C. Comparable Employment
An individual has the right to select his own line of work, profession, or
calling and will not be required to seek employment outside of the scope of his
chosen field in order to mitigate damages that may be sustained as a result of a
termination of his employment contract.115 A terminated employee has a duty
to mitigate damages by accepting employment that is found to be similar to the
employment that was expected by his contract.116 “However, a plaintiff’s duty
to mitigate his damages is not met by using reasonable diligence to obtain any
employment; the employment must be substantially equivalent
employment.”117
The employee within this context is not required to mitigate damages by
accepting employment that is found to be within the same general field of
work that was previously held by the employee but that is outside of his

110. See Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 457 (2d Cir. 1997).
111. See In re Davidson, 978 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2009).
112. Id. at 5 (quoting NLRB v Westin Hotel, 758 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1985)).
113. See 7 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 72:45 (2013).
114. 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR § 62:72 (2013).
115. See Mason Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State Superintendent of Sch., 295 S.E.2d 719, 723–26
(W. Va. 1982).
116. Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 815 (W. Va. 2009) (“Unless a
wrongful discharge is malicious, the wrongfully discharged employee has a duty to mitigate damages
by accepting similar employment to that contemplated by his or her contract if it is available in the
local area, and the actual wages received, or the wages the employee could have received at
comparable employment where it is locally available, will be deducted from any back pay award;
however, the burden of raising the issue of mitigation is on the employer.”) (quoting Mason Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 295 S.E.2d at 719–20) (emphasis omitted).
117. Finch v. Hercules Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395, 1421 (D. Del. 1996) (citing Booker v. Taylor
Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 866 (3d Cir. 1995)).
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specialized area.118 Therefore, an employee is not required to accept
employment that is not “substantially equivalent” to the employee’s prior
employment.119 A plaintiff, in mitigating his damages, will not be required to
accept a new position that is “less favorable” in its contractual terms than his
prior employment.120 However, a discharged employee may have a duty to
accept a paying job that is lower than the compensation that he received from
his previous employment after an extended but otherwise unsuccessful search
for a job.121
Two jobs are comparable or substantially similar if they are of the same
nature and if the pay, benefits, and working conditions are substantially
similar.122 Generally, an employee will not be required to travel any distance
in order to obtain new employment, although distance is one of the factors that
is considered in evaluating the reasonable diligent efforts that were used by the
employee.123 In following that same rationale, several courts have found that
discharged employees are not obligated to accept lesser employment, nor are
they required to relocate to a new community.124 Although this may be the
general rule, this finding may be difficult in its application to coaching
contracts. In order for a discharged coach to find employment that will be
deemed “comparable” to mitigate his damages, he may be required to relocate
to a different community and conference or even to a different state.
The duty that is placed upon a plaintiff to mitigate damages by obtaining
comparable employment does not require the plaintiff to accept a position that
will cause personal embarrassment or great hardship.125

118. Walmsley v. Brady, 793 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D.R.I. 1992) (finding that the plaintiff, who
was a trained surgical veterinarian, was not required to alter her professional career path by practicing
veterinary medicine without performing an extensive amount of surgeries or by serving as an
administrative veterinarian in order to mitigate damages).
119. Vaughn v. Sabine Cnty., 104 F. App’x 980, 984 (5th Cir. 2004).
120. Mallek v. City of San Benito, 121 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1997). In this case, a plaintiff’s
duty to mitigate damages for a breach of an employment contract did “not include the duty to accept a
new and different bargain with terms less favorable than those to which he had previously agreed.”
Id.
121. Meyer v. United Air Lines, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 874, 876–77 (N.D. Ill. 1997). In this case,
the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages when she accepted a part-time position at one half of her
former pay without conducting a search for a full-time job. Id.
122. Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass’n v. Pers. Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288–89 (Ct. App. 1973).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 455 cmt. d (1958); Hadra v. Herman Blum
Consulting Eng’rs, 632 F.2d 1242, 1246 (5th Cir. 1980); Salem Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Richman, 406
N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Seco Chems., Inc. v. Stewart, 349 N.E.2d 733, 740–41
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976)).
124. See, e.g., Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 22 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
125. Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities v. Miller, 145 P.3d 521, 532 (Alaska 2006).
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D. Offset
The amount of damages a terminated employee may be awarded is offset
by any income received from actual post-termination employment or by the
amount of income that would have been received if the employee had satisfied
his obligation to mitigate damages.126 An employee must use reasonable
diligence to mitigate damages, and any amount that may have been earned
through such efforts is offset against the damages caused by the breach.127
The measure of said damages is based on “the contract price for the unexpired
term less what the employee has earned, or by reasonable diligence in
mitigation of damages could have earned, in other employment since the
discharge.”128 A discharged employee’s recovery of damages will “place the
[employee] in the same economic position the [employee] would have attained
if the contract had been performed.”129 The duty of “mitigation places no
greater burden on a non-breaching party than to make a reasonable effort to
minimize loss, and a party who tries to do so, but fails, will recover the total
damages owed in each case.”130 Therefore, an employee who contracted for
damages or has bargained for liquidated damages will receive those damages
minus any monies that are earned from comparable employment or, in the
alternative, monies that the employee could have earned if the employee had
used reasonable diligence to obtain comparable employment after the
discharge. In agreeing to a liquidated damages provision, the parties bargain
in order to prevent a claim that will permit the other party to be unjustly
enriched if the liquidated damages provision is enforced without offsetting the
benefits received by the non-breaching party.131
E. Burden of Proof
The concept of a “burden of proof” is referred to as establishing by a

126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1981).
127. Murphy v. Gulf Consol. Int’l, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 383, 383 (Tex. App. 1984).
128. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Evans, 493 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Dunkin’
Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Minerva, Inc., 956 F.2d 1566, 1582 n. 47 (11th Cir. 1992) (“‘The measure of
damages recoverable by an employee wrongfully discharged before the expiration of an employment
contract is the wages he would have earned under the contract less what he did in fact earn or in the
exercise of proper diligence might have earned in another employment.’”) (quoting Nat’l Med. Care,
Inc. v. Zigelbaum, 468 N.E.2d 868, 876 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)).
129. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.4 (4th ed.
1998).
130. Lisa A. Fortin, Note, Why There Should Be a Duty to Mitigate Liquidated Damages
Clauses, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 292 (2009).
131. Vrgora v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 200 Cal. Rptr. 130, 135–36 (Ct. App. 1984).
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preponderance of the evidence what the truth of the basic proposition is,132
i.e., “‘the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is
more probable than its non-existence.’”133 The defendant employer therefore
has the burden of production and the burden of persuasion in proving a
plaintiff’s failure to mitigate.134
An employee’s failure to mitigate damages appropriately may be found if
an employee has not made a reasonable, diligent effort to find comparable
employment.135 The burden of proof is placed upon the employer to show that
the employee, through the use of reasonable diligence, obtained or could have
obtained employment that is similar to the employee’s abilities.136 The
employer is required to prove not only that the employee did not exercise
reasonable efforts in his attempt to obtain employment, but the employer must
also prove that suitable work was available.137 The rationale for placing the
burden on the employer is that the “basic principles of equity and fairness
mandate that the burden of proof must remain on the employer because the
employer’s illegal discharge of the employee precipitated the search for
another job.”138 Although the burden is placed on the employer to prove that
the employee failed to mitigate damages, the employee should nonetheless be
prepared to produce evidence that will demonstrate a good faith effort on the
part of the employee to find suitable alternative employment.139 In
consideration of whether the plaintiff mitigated damages, the courts ask
whether the employee acted in a “‘reasonable manner consistent with what an
ordinarily prudent person would do in similar circumstances.’”140
132. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 171–73 (2008).
133. Transammonia Export Corp. v. Conserv, Inc., 554 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 671.1-201(8) (1976)).
134. Marks v. Prattco, Inc., 633 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1981).
135. Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 5, 7 (D. Me. 2003) (finding that
an employee failed to exercise reasonable diligence in mitigating damages).
136. See Sellers v. Delgado Coll., 902 F.2d 1189, 1194–95 (5th Cir. 1990).
137. Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 681 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. 1996) (observing that in a breach of
employment contract case, the burden is on the employer to show that loss could have been avoided;
the employer may do so “‘by proving that other substantially equivalent positions were available . . .
and that [the employee] failed to use reasonable diligence in attempting to secure those positions.’”)
(quoting In re Edge, 606 A.2d 1243, 1247 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)); Lee v. Scotia Prince Cruises Ltd.,
828 A.2d 210, 216 (Me. 2003) (finding that “[a] plaintiff has a duty to use reasonable efforts to
mitigate his or her damages, but because mitigation is an affirmative defense, the burden is on the
defendant to show that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages”).
138. NLRB v. Westin Hotel, 758 F.2d 1126, 1130 (6th Cir. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Shelton v. Clements, 834 So. 2d 775, 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (quoting Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Goodin, 535 So. 2d 98, 103 (Ala. 1988)). A party is barred from recovering for losses that
were due to his failure to act reasonably. Id. at 783.
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In order to submit a failure to mitigate damages claim to the jury, the
employer must
[I]ntroduce substantial evidence that (1) there was something
the plaintiff could have done to mitigate his loss, (2) requiring
the plaintiff to do so was reasonable under the circumstances,
(3) the plaintiff acted unreasonably in failing to undertake the
mitigating activity, and (4) a causal connection exists between
the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate and the damages claimed.141
The employer must prove “‘that, based on undisputed facts in the record,
during the time in question there were substantially equivalent jobs available,
which the plaintiff could have obtained, and that the plaintiff failed to use
reasonable diligence in seeking one.’”142 Specifically, the employer must
prove the earnings that the discharged employee actually earned or may have
earned from alternative employment through the use of reasonable diligence
during the remainder of the contract term.143
F. Failure to Mitigate
Courts have held that the failure to mitigate damages on the part of the
plaintiff is an affirmative defense that must be either asserted or it will be
waived on the part of the defendant.144 The defendant then carries the burden
of raising the mitigation issue in its pleadings.145 A defendant’s failure to
raise mitigation may cause the defense to be considered waived.146 An
obligation is also placed on the defendant to sufficiently plead the defense,
which will in turn put the plaintiff on notice of the defense.147
By considering the legal principles mentioned above when drafting

141. Vasconez v. Mills, 651 N.W.2d 48, 53–54 (Iowa 2002) (citing Greenwood v. Mitchell,
621 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa 2001)) (holding that a defendant asserting a failure to mitigate damages
claim on the part of the plaintiff holds the burden of proving the elements of the defense).
142. Hughes v. Mayoral, 721 F. Supp. 2d 947, 967 (D. Haw. 2010) (quoting Odima v. Westin
Tuscon Hotel, 53 F.3d 1484, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995)).
143. Juvenile Diabetes Research Found. v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); see generally Bornstein v. Neuman, 459 N.Y.S.2d 462 (App. Div. 1983).
144. Sayre v. Musicland Grp., Inc., 850 F.2d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 1988).
145. See id.
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (requiring a party to plead affirmative defenses); Modern Leasing,
Inc. v. Falcon Mfg. of Cal., Inc., 888 F.2d 59, 62–63 (8th Cir. 1989) (denying the defense’s post-trial
motion to amend pleadings to include a mitigation defense because the mitigation issue was not raised
during trial); Morgenstern v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. CV 04–58(ARL), 2009 WL 5103158, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (holding that a defendant’s failure to plead mitigation would mean that the
defense was waived).
147. City of Miami Beach v. Carner, 579 So. 2d 248, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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contractual provisions, attorneys should be able to effectively protect their
clients’ financial interests.
V. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
A well-drafted mitigation of damages clause in the context of a college
coach’s contract will contain the following elements:
1. An affirmative obligation to mitigate;
2. A requirement that reasonable and diligent efforts be used to obtain
comparable employment;
3. A definition of what constitutes comparable employment;
4. The meaning of compensation;
5. An offset provision including the university’s continued liability
for any differential if amounts are offset;
6. A reporting function;
7. Notice of employment; and
8. Prospective rather than retroactive application.
1. Affirmative Obligation to Mitigate. An affirmative obligation to
mitigate is a basic tenet of contract law and requires, unless otherwise stated,
the coach to reduce damages owed from the terminating university by
undertaking acts of mitigation. Some examples follow:
o KELLY - University of Oregon: “Kelly agrees to mitigate
University’s obligations to pay liquidated damages . . . .”148
o MURPHY - Eastern Michigan University: “The Employee is
required to mitigate the University’s obligations under [this]
section . . . .”149
o CLAWSON - Bowling Green State University: “The University’s
obligation to any amount under Section 5.2.2 (a) shall be subject
to Coach Clawson’s duty to mitigate his damages.”150
o MONTGOMERY - University of California: “Coach agrees to
mitigate UNIVERSITY’s obligations to pay damages that may be
sustained by virtue of termination . . . .”151
o GOTTFRIED - NC State University: “COACH acknowledges his
obligation to minimize the payments due to him under section
148. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(c).
149. Coaching Contract between Robert L. Murphy and E. Mich. Univ. ¶ 7.2.4 (Apr. 25, 2011)
(on file with author).
150. Coaching Contract between Dave Clawson and Bowling Green State Univ. ¶ 5.2.3(a)
(Dec. 11, 2008) (on file with author).
151. 2008 Montgomery Contract, supra note 20, ¶ 12.
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XIII(A) . . . .”152
o CALIPARI - University of Kentucky: “Notwithstanding any other
provisions contained in this Agreement, Coach agrees to
reasonably mitigate the University’s obligation to pay liquidated
damages under this Agreement . . . .”153
2. A Reasonable and Diligent Effort. A mitigation of damages provision
will require a reasonable and diligent effort to obtain employment. Some
examples follow:
o CREAN - Indiana University: “The Employee is required to use
his reasonable best efforts to mitigate . . . .”154
o LONDON - University of Virginia: “Coach agrees to make
reasonable ongoing efforts in seeking employment commensurate
with his experience, in good faith . . . .”155
o ROBINSON - Oregon State University: “COACH agrees to
mitigate . . . by making reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain
employment.”156
o MILES - LSU: “COACH has the good faith duty and obligation to
seek to obtain similar or related employment . . . .”157
o PELINI - University of Nebraska: “Coach shall use his . . . best
efforts to seek and secure substantially comparable employment
including the customary and reasonable terms and conditions of
compensation at the new employment, without structuring or
timing compensation to avoid mitigation.”158
o CALIPARI - University of Kentucky: “Coach agrees . . . to make
reasonable and diligent efforts to obtain employment as soon as
possible after termination of this Agreement by the University.”159
3. Comparable Employment. A mitigation of damages provision will
provide for the coach to seek on a good faith basis “comparable employment.”
Some examples follow:
o PELINI- University of Nebraska: “Coach shall use his . . . best
efforts to seek and secure substantially comparable

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Gottfried Contract, supra note 76, ¶ XIII(B).
Calipari Contract, supra note 13, ¶ 7(b).
Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(G).
London Contract, supra note 70, ¶ 7.3
Robinson Contract, supra note 67, ¶ 19(b).
2007 Miles Amendment, supra note 14, ¶ 13(A).
Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 14(b).
Calipari Contract, supra note 13, ¶ 7(b).
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employment . . . .”160
o KELLY - University of Oregon: “Kelly agrees to mitigate . . . by
making reasonable, good faith, and diligent efforts to obtain
comparable employment as soon as reasonably possible after
termination of this Agreement.”161
A legal dispute involving the duty to mitigate damages in a coach’s
employment contract is found in Moore v. University of Notre Dame.162 In
this case, the plaintiff, Joseph R. Moore, was the offensive line football coach
for the University of Notre Dame from 1988 to 1996.163 Under his instruction,
the team’s offensive line was “ranked among the top ten in the country.”164 In
December of 1996, Notre Dame terminated Moore’s employment.165 Moore
alleged that head football coach Robert Davie told Moore that he “was fired
because he was ‘too old’ and would not be able to continue to coach for
another full five-year period.”166 Notre Dame claimed that the reason behind
Moore’s termination was that he no longer measured up to the standards that
were set in the program, and Notre Dame further claimed that Moore made
inappropriate and intimidating comments to his players.167
Notre Dame argued that Moore was not entitled to front pay because he
failed to take reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages.168 Judge Allen
Sharp’s decision in this case addressed Moore’s duty to mitigate damages.
Judge Sharp stated:
Notre Dame finally argues that Moore is not entitled to front
pay because he failed to undertake reasonable efforts to
mitigate his damages. This Court disagrees. Generally, an
ADEA plaintiff satisfies the mitigation of damages
requirement that he use “reasonable diligence in attempting to
secure employment” by demonstrating his commitment to
seeking active employment and by remaining ready, willing
and able to work. However, a plaintiffs [sic] duty to mitigate
his damages is not met by using reasonable diligence to obtain

160. Pelini Contract, supra note 15, ¶ 14(b).
161. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(c).
162. See generally 22 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
163. Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330, 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1997).
164. Id.; see also Coach Who Tackled Age Discrimination Dies, USA TODAY (July 6, 2003),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2003-07-06-moore-obit_x.htm.
165. Moore, 968 F. Supp. at 1332.
166. Id.
167. See Moore, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 905–06.
168. Id. at 906.
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any employment, rather the employment must be comparable
employment. The Seventh Circuit has defined “comparable
work” as a position that affords “virtually identical
promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities,
working conditions and status” as the previous position. The
goal of mitigation is to prevent the plaintiff from remaining
idle and doing nothing. Furthermore, an employee is not
required to go to heroic lengths in attempting to mitigate his
damages, but only to take reasonable steps to do so.
Furthermore, a claimant has no obligation to accept lesser
employment . . . or relocate to a new community.169
Judge Sharp further found:
When evaluating the reasonableness and duration of a job
search a court may consider the plaintiff’s background and
individual characteristics. Moreover, it is the defendant’s
burden to prove that a plaintiff has failed to discharge his
duty. In the present case, Notre Dame has not met this
burden. Moore sought and obtained employment shortly after
his discharge. He currently works at three different jobs. The
fact that he did not accept a position at Cornell does not
indicate a failure to mitigate. That position offered a $40,000
salary, significantly less than Moore’s former salary, and
involved a tenuous situation where the head coach was
seeking other employment. Nor does the fact that Moore did
not apply for certain positions mentioned by defendant
indicate a failure to mitigate. Moore is presently sixty-six
years old. The options available to him are not as great as
those available to someone younger. Moore has demonstrated
his willingness to work, but, the chances of finding
“comparable work” as defined by the Seventh Circuit are
slim. It is this Court’s opinion that Moore used reasonable
diligence in attempting to obtain employment.170
4. Definition of Comparable Employment. In some mitigation of
damages provisions, comparable employment will actually be specifically
defined. Some examples follow:
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “[E]mployment as a head or
assistant coach or as an administrator either at a college or

169. Id. at 906–07 (internal citations omitted).
170. Id. at 907 (internal citations omitted).
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university or with a professional sports organization (collectively
referred to hereafter as a ‘Coaching Position’)[.]”171
LONDON - University of Virginia: “Such payments shall be
reduced by earnings or other payments the Coach may
subsequently receive, or earn and defer receipt of, from
athletically-related employment or consulting. Such employment
or consulting includes but is not limited to any head coach or
assistant coaching or other athletic position with, or consulting or
other services of any kind provided to, any school, college,
university, professional or semi-professional athletic team or any
athletic conference, organization, league or association, or from
any sports-related position or services provided to any sportsrelated entity, including without limitation any media entity.”172
CALHOUN - University of Connecticut (Retired): “Any such
payment shall be reduced, however, by an amount equal to the
compensation (to include salary and value of fringe benefits) the
Coach actually earns in any basketball-related position from the
date of termination to the end of this Agreement.”173
KELLY - University of Oregon: “Comparable employment
includes employment as a coach (not necessarily as a head coach)
at a university that competes on the NCAA Division 1-A (Football
Bowl Subdivision) or 1-AA (Football Championship Subdivision)
level or equivalent, or with a professional team.”174
O’LEARY - University of Central Florida: “Any sums payable
pursuant to paragraph 9.2 shall be reduced by any amounts earned
by Coach or George O’Leary Enterprises, Inc. during the
remaining term of the agreement in connection with Coach’s
employment as a coach of any college or professional football
team.”175
O’BRIEN - North Carolina State University (terminated): “If the
COACH obtains new employment, NC STATE’s financial
obligations under the liquidated damages provision shall be to pay
COACH the difference between what COACH would have
received as Head Football Coach at NC STATE for the term of

171. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(h).
172. London Contract, supra note 70, ¶ 7.3.
173. Coaching Contract between James A. Calhoun and Univ. of Conn. ¶ 10.2 (July 1, 2009)
(on file with author).
174. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(c).
175. O’Leary Contract, supra note 88, ¶ 9.2(E).
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this Agreement and the salary in the new job.”176 (There is no
definition of new employment).
HOWLAND - UCLA (terminated): “[P]ayments made to Coach
. . . shall be reduced by any cash payments or other form of
consideration Coach, and/or any person or entity acting on
Coach’s behalf, receives from other sources, including University,
for services performed by Coach, including without limitation,
promotional, endorsement, coaching, or consultative services
during the period of time Coach would have been employed by
University if University had not so terminated this 2008 HC
Agreement.”177
CREAN - Indiana University: “[T]he Employee agrees that the
following employment or services opportunities shall constitute a
comparable position or opportunity for purposes of this provision;
media commentator with a national or regional network, broadcast
station or cable company, professional basketball assistant or head
coach, head men’s basketball coach at a Division I college or
university . . . .”178
MARSHALL - Wichita State University: “[B]y obtaining
comparable employment at a similar rate of compensation or other
opportunities within the scope of his expertise to provide personal
services for remuneration.”179
PINKEL - University of Missouri: “[T]hat any amounts received
by the Employee from other employment for services or obtained
as a consultant or rendered as a head or assistant football coach or
as an administrator or executive in a collegiate athletic department
or professional sports organization before the end of the term of
this Agreement, shall be offset against the amount set forth herein
to be paid by the University as liquidated damages.”180
RICHT - University of Georgia: “[T]he parties understand and
agree that the Association’s liability, if any, for payments
provided under this paragraph 15 shall be reduced by any and all

176. Coaching Contract between Thomas Patrick O’Brien, Jr. and N.C. State Univ. ¶ X(B)
(Dec. 8, 2006) (on file with author).
177. Howland Contract, supra note 51, ¶ 12(b).
178. Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(G).
179. Coaching Contract between Gregg Marshall and Wichita State Univ. ¶ 8.3 (Apr. 16, 2011)
(on file with author).
180. Coaching Contract between Gary R. Pinkel and Univ. of Mo. ¶ 12 (Jan. 1, 2009) (on file
with author).

GREENBERG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

376

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

5/7/2013 2:32 PM

[Vol. 23:2

compensation attributable to Richt’s coaching or providing
athletic administration services for any sports team (whether as a
head coach, assistant coach, athletic director or assistant athletic
director, or consultant); to Richt’s fundraising, talent evaluation or
consulting services to any sports team or athletics programs; or to
any Radio, TV, magazine, newspaper, movie, or other media
outlet appearance or commentary made by Richt after the date of
termination through the end of the Term. The Association’s right
to offset payment pursuant to this subparagraph shall not include
sums earned by Richt through passive investment or activities not
related to the foregoing.”181
o TRESSEL - Ohio State University (contract terminated by coach):
“Coach is required to mitigate Ohio State’s obligations under this
Section 5.2 by making reasonable and diligent efforts (under the
circumstances and opportunities then prevailing) to obtain a
comparable employment position (for example, media
commentator, professional head or assistant football coach,
NCAA Division I head football coach) as soon as practicable
following such termination[.]”182
o HOKE - University of Michigan: “[T]o obtain other football
related employment (such as a head or assistant coach of a
professional football team, head men’s football coach of an
NCAA Division I team, or media commentator) . . . .”183
o GOTTFRIED - NC State University: “If the COACH obtains new
employment as a collegiate or professional basketball
coach . . . .”184
5. Meaning of Compensation. In some mitigation of damages provisions,
the meaning of compensation is specifically defined:
o BRILES - Currently the Baylor University coach, but the contract
provision was taken from his prior contract with the University of
Houston: “For the purposes of this Section 6.4.5, ‘amounts earned
by Coach in the new position’ shall mean any and all
compensation received through Coach’s employment, including,
but not limited to, base salary, non-salary compensation,

181. Amendment to Coaching Contract between Mark Richt and Univ. of Ga. ¶ 15(E) (Jan. 1,
2006) (on file with author).
182. Coaching Contract between James P. Tressel and Ohio State Univ. ¶ 5.2(a) (Feb. 1, 2006)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Tressel Contract].
183. Hoke Contract, supra note 75, ¶ 4.01(b).
184. Gottfried Contract, supra note 76, ¶ XIII(B).
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consulting fees, bonuses, and any other compensation[.]”185
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “For purposes of this
subsection, ‘gross compensation’ shall mean, without limitation,
gross income from base salary or wages, talent fees, or other types
of compensation paid to Employee . . . , consulting fees,
honoraria, fees received by Employee as an independent
contractor, or other income of any kind whatsoever from a
Coaching Position.”186
6. Offset Provision. In the event the coach receives monies from another
employer in his attempt to mitigate damages, there will always be an offset
provision against the monies that are owed from the university. Some
examples follow:
o HOKE - University of Michigan: “If the Head Coach is employed
in a football-related position or receives compensation related
thereto (e.g.[,] as a consultant) elsewhere after the University’s
termination of this Agreement pursuant to Section 4.01(a), then
the University’s obligation to pay the Head Coach as set forth in
Section 4.01(a) shall be reduced by Head Coach’s total
compensation from all such sources (except not including
employee reimbursements, benefits and costs associated with such
other position).”187
o HEATH - University of South Florida: “Notwithstanding the
foregoing, if Coach subsequently obtains employment in another
basketball coaching capacity prior to the expiration of the term of
the Agreement, then the following shall apply: (i) if Coach’s new
base salary is greater than the Base Salary, then the University’s
obligations to make payment(s) under this Section shall cease as
of the first date of new employment; or (ii) if Coach’s new base
salary is less than the Base Salary, then the University shall only
be obligated to pay for the difference between the two amounts,
less any salary increases paid by the new employer, through the
expiration of the term of the Agreement.”188
o KELLY - University of Oregon: “Should Kelly obtain such
comparable employment, University’s financial obligations under

185. Coaching Contract between Art Briles and Univ. of Hous. ¶ 6.4.5 (Jan 1, 2004) (on file
with author).
186. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(h).
187. Hoke Contract, supra note 75, ¶ 4.01(b).
188. Coaching Contract between Stan Heath and Univ. of S. Fla. ¶ 11(a) (May 24, 2007) (on
file with author).
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this Agreement, including Section 6.02.b, shall cease so long as
Kelly’s monthly compensation from such comparable
employment, excluding reasonable and usual non-monetary fringe
benefits such as health and life insurance, club memberships and
use of vehicles, is equal to or greater than University’s obligation
to pay liquidated damages under Section 6.02.b, prorated on a
monthly basis.
If Kelly’s monthly compensation, excluding reasonable and
usual non-monetary fringe benefits, from such comparable
employment is less than University’s monthly obligation to pay
liquidated damages under Section 6.02.b, the amount of
University’s obligation to pay liquidated damages shall be reduced
by the amount of Kelly’s compensation, excluding reasonable and
usual non-monetary fringe benefits, from such comparable
employment.
If, after diligent efforts to obtain comparable employment as
described above, Kelly obtains employment that is not comparable
employment, his income from such employment (plus or minus
raises and adjustments) shall be off-set against University’s
obligations under 6.02.b herein.”189
CHIZIK - Auburn University (terminated): “In the event Coach
obtains other employment after his termination or receives income
from any other source (such as for work as an announcer or
analyst, consultant, independent contractor, speaking engagement
fees, income from writing a book, or appearance fees), the amount
earned or received by Coach will be subtracted from the amount
Auburn owes Coach under this Paragraph.”190
MONTGOMERY - University of California: “Notwithstanding
the liquidated damages provision below, it is expressly understood
and agreed that any amounts to be paid to Coach pursuant to this
Paragraph 12 will be reduced by any amounts received, or to be
received at a later date, by Coach from other sources in and for
rendition of services by Coach during the period of time in which
Coach, pursuant to this Employment Contract, would have been
employed by the UNIVERSITY if this Contract had not been
terminated by the UNIVERSITY without cause; provided,
however, under no circumstances will Coach be required to
reimburse the UNIVERSITY for UNIVERSITY compensation

189. Kelly Contract, supra note 47, ¶ 6.02(c).
190. Chizik Contract, supra note 53, ¶ 18(b).
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previously paid.”191
o TRESSEL - Ohio State University (contract terminated by coach):
“Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Section 5.2, if
Coach is employed elsewhere during the twelve (12) month period
post-termination in a comparable employment position (for
example, media commentator, professional head or assistant
football coach, NCAA Division 1 head football coach), then Ohio
State’s obligation to pay Coach Two Million Dollars
($2,000,000.00) set forth in this Section 5.2 shall be reduced by
Coach’s total compensation (from all sources directly related to
such comparable position (except not including the employee
benefits costs associated with such comparable position)) for the
twelve (12) month period post-termination. Ohio State shall pay
such amount (which shall not include employee benefits for the
period that Coach is employed in such comparable position) in
equal quarterly installments for a period not to exceed twelve (12)
months after the date of termination, except the installments may
not be equal if Coach is employed in such a comparable
employment position (thus reducing Ohio State’s obligation) and
Ohio State has already paid Coach certain installments pursuant to
this Section 5.2 before Coach has accepted such a comparable
employment position[.]”192
7. Notice of Employment. Mitigation of damages provisions will require
the coach to give notice of new employment. A few examples follow:
o SABAN - University of Alabama: “While the University’s
obligation to pay Liquidated Damages remains in effect, within
fourteen (14) days after accepting any employment in a Coaching
Position and within fourteen (14) days after the end of each month
thereafter, Employee shall furnish to the University an accounting
or report of all gross compensation received by Employee during
the immediately preceding month from the Coaching Position.
The University shall reduce the amount of the monthly Liquidated
Damages payments due and payable to Employee based upon the
gross compensation for the immediate previous month as reflected
in the Coaching Position gross compensation report. If Employee
fails or refuses either to notify the University of Employees
employment in a Coaching Position or to furnish the monthly
191. Coaching Contract between Michael Montgomery and Univ. of Cal. ¶ 12 (Feb. 27, 2009)
(on file with author).
192. Tressel Contract, supra note 182, ¶ 5.2(b).

GREENBERG FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

380

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

5/7/2013 2:32 PM

[Vol. 23:2

Coaching Position gross compensation reports after receiving a
formal, written request to do so from the University, then, after
giving Employee fourteen (14) days’ written notice, the
University’s obligation to continue paying Liquidated Damages to
Employee shall cease.”193
o GOTTFRIED - NC State University: “COACH shall promptly,
upon acceptance of other employment as a collegiate or
professional basketball coach, notify the Director of Athletics in
writing of such employment and the total compensation to be paid
to COACH for the employment during the term of this Agreement
(had it naturally expired). In addition, COACH agrees to provide
NC STATE with a copy of his W-2 form for each calendar year as
long as NC STATE has the obligation to make payments under
section XIII.”194
o CREAN - University of Indiana: “[T]he Employee shall promptly
report to the University on a quarterly basis on all compensation
received or earned by him (or by any of his affiliates) during the
prior three-month and six-month periods. The University may
reduce future base []salary continuation payments by any amount
that the University is entitled to offset as a consequence of the
foregoing provisions and at the conclusion of the base salary
continuation period, the Employee shall be obligated to promptly
pay to the[] University the full amount of any offset and reduction
due to mitigation that the University is entitled to that was not
fully recouped by the University[] through a previous offset and
reduction.”195
8. Prospective Rather than Retroactive Application. Any amount received
in mitigation of damages that acts as an offset against the amount being paid
contractually by the university shall apply prospectively, not retroactively. So
for instance, a coach was terminated without cause and the liquidated damage
amount was $3,600,000, payable in equal monthly installments of $100,000
per month for 36 months.196 The coach obtained new employment after the
eighteenth month payment. The coach’s new package was equal to double
what the university was obligated to pay during the liquidated damage period.
The excess could not be used to retroactively offset those amounts that had
193. Saban Contract, supra note 12, ¶ 5.01(h).
194. Gottfried Contract, supra note 76, ¶ XIII(B).
195. Crean Contract, supra note 16, ¶ 6.02(G).
196. The information in this paragraph comes from a confidential case worked on by Author
Greenberg.
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previously been paid or to require, in the alternative, that the coach reimburse
the university for those amounts.
Although these contractual terms seem straightforward and simple in
theory, the practical application of mitigation of damages provisions to
coaching contracts is slightly more difficult.
VI. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE—DIFFICULTY WITH MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
CLAUSES
I served as an expert witness in a case involving the interpretation and
implementation of a mitigation of damages clause.197 The coach was
terminated without cause. Thus, the termination triggered the mitigation of
damages clause, and it became a disputed issue.
A. The Contractual Provision
The coach’s contract provided with respect to termination without cause
and mitigation of damages as follows:
(1) Severance/Liquidated Damages. If, during the term of
this Agreement, Coach’s employment is terminated by the
Team for a reason other than for Cause, the Team shall
continue to pay Coach his applicable monthly salary (i.e., as
set forth and in accordance with the Section above), for the
remainder of the period this Agreement was to have remained
in effect. Such salary continuation payments shall be made on
a semi-monthly basis on the Team’s regular payroll cycle and
shall be paid less all applicable taxes, withholdings, payroll
deductions. In addition, such salary continuation payments
shall be subject to the mitigation and set-off provisions
contained in the Section below.
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, the Team shall incur no
obligation to provide severance benefits under this Section if
his employment is terminated by disability or by death under
the provisions of the Sections above.
(2) Mitigation.
Coach agrees to mitigate the Team’s
obligation to pay liquidated damages under this Section. The
Team shall be entitled to off-set and reduce any and all

197. The “I” in this sentence and the following information regarding the arbitration concerns
Author Greenberg. Identifying information about the participants of the arbitration cannot be
included due to the confidentiality of the arbitration.
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amounts of compensation that may be due to Coach from the
Team under this Section against any amounts earned by
Coach under contracts with other individuals or entities
provided that this right of set-off is limited to a head coaching
and/or general manager position with the NBA club or NCAA
institution. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is the specific
agreement between Coach and the Team that the operation
and implementation of this set-off provision shall never result
in Coach’s receipt of compensation less than would have been
received for the period this Agreement was to have remained
in effect.198
The agreement was subject to arbitration, which stated as follows:
a. Arbitrable Claims. All disputes between Coach (and his
attorneys, successors, and assigns) and the Team (and its
affiliates, partners, directors, officers, employees, agents,
successors, attorneys, and assigns) of any kind whatsoever,
including, without limitation, all disputes relating in any
manner to the employment or termination of Coach, and all
disputes arising under this Agreement, (“Arbitrable Claims”)
shall be resolved by arbitration. All persons and entities
specified in the preceding sentence (other than the Team and
Coach) shall be considered third-party beneficiaries of the
rights and obligations created by this Section on Arbitration.
Arbitrable Claims shall include, but are not limited to,
contract (express or implied) and tort claims of all kinds, as
well as all claims based on any federal, state, or local law,
statute, or regulation, excepting only claims under applicable
workers’ compensation law and unemployment insurance
claims. Arbitration shall be final and binding upon the parties
and shall be the exclusive remedy for all Arbitrable Claims,
except that the Parties may seek provisional relief as provided
by law. The parties hereby waive any rights they may have to
trial by jury in regard to arbitrable claims.
b. Procedure. Arbitration or Arbitrable Claims shall be in
accordance with the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules,
except as provided otherwise in this Agreement. In any
arbitration, the burden of proof shall be allocated as provided
in applicable law. Either party may bring an action in court to

198. Coaching Contract between X and Univ. Y (on file with author).
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compel arbitration under this Agreement and to enforce an
arbitration award. Otherwise, neither party shall initiate or
prosecute any lawsuit or administrative action in any way
related to any Arbitrable Claim. All arbitration hearings
under this Agreement shall be conducted in . . . . The Federal
Arbitration Act shall govern the interpretation and
enforcement of this Section.
c. Confidentiality. All proceeds and all documents prepared
in connection with any Arbitrable Claim shall be confidential
and, unless otherwise required by law, the subject matter
thereof shall not be disclosed to any person other than the
parties to the proceedings, their counsel, witnesses and
experts, the arbitrator, and, if involved, the court and court
staff.
d. Continuing Obligations. The rights and obligations of
Coach and the Team set forth in this Section on Arbitration
shall survive the termination of Coach’s employment and the
expiration of this Agreement.199
B. Team and Coach’s Allegations
The coach was terminated without cause, and approximately twenty-one
months passed before he procured new employment. Consequently, the team
stopped paying the coach the amounts required under the termination without
cause provision. The coach then filed for arbitration seeking the liquidated
damages he believed he was entitled to pursuant to the contract. The team
defended on the basis that the coach had a statutory common law and
contractual obligation to mitigate damages and failed to do so; as a result, this
failure relieved the team completely or partially from the obligation to make
payment. The team further defended that any amount the coach was entitled
to claim must be offset and reduced by those amounts he actually earned or
could have earned after his discharge by the team. The team asserted that its
obligation was to make payments that were conditioned on the coach’s
common law, statutory, and contractual mitigation obligations.
The mitigation provision reproduced above indicates that the coach had a
clear duty to take steps to minimize any loss by making a reasonable effort to
find comparable employment. While the team continued to pay the coach his
salary after termination, the coach breached his mitigation obligation during
the same period by, among other things, failing to make a reasonable effort to
199. See supra notes 197–98.
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seek mitigating employment and by purposely not seeking such employment.
In its counterclaim, the team indicated that, as a result of the coach’s
breach, it was entitled to retain all amounts withheld from the coach to date in
addition to a return of some or all of the monies paid to the coach since his
termination.
The team alleged that the coach failed to engage in a good faith and
diligent effort to mitigate damages. The issues raised with respect to the lack
of good faith effort to obtain employment were as follows:
1. The absence of an affirmative marketing plan;
2. A passive and inactive approach versus a proactive approach to
obtaining employment;
3. Minimal attempts to market the coach, indicated by the lack of
marketing material of a substantive nature on the coach for prospective
employers;
4. The coach was not positioned for potential employment openings;
5. The coach retained one of the leading representatives of coaches in the
industry, but there was little evidence that that representative was involved in
the placement effort at all; rather, a junior associate with little or no experience
was heading up the job procurement effort;
6. Inquiries and follow-up from the junior associate indicated a lack of
serious effort to place the coach;
7. Communications to prospective employers indicated a lack of a serious
interest; for example, only passive inquiries were made to the tune of “If
you’re interested, call me”;
8. There was a lack of follow-through with respect to any inquiries that
were made;
9. The agent adopted a strategy that is commonly referred to as “slow
play”;
10. There was a question as to whether the coach was really interested in
working by virtue of several public statements that he was not ready to work;
11. The coach was unwilling to leave a certain geographical area, only
wanted to be placed within a certain conference, and did not necessarily want
to move from his home in his current location;
12. There was an absence of any kind of paper trail and little evidence of
marketing materials, such as books, letters, or emails to potential employers;
13. There was no notebook or diary on the coach’s mitigation efforts;
14. The coach’s agents had conflict of interests that would have lessened
attempts to place the coach; and
15. The agents had other coaches in their client’s stable who were
interested in the mitigation jobs that were available during the mitigation
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period and who were willing to relocate.
The next area of concern in the arbitration was the issue of whether there
was the availability of comparable employment. The coach maintained that it
would be impossible for him to obtain another professional or collegiate job
after the termination and so close to the date of termination. With respect to
college jobs that became available, the coach maintained that the positions
available were not identical from the standpoint of location, compensation, job
responsibility, working conditions, and status. The coach claimed that he was
tainted by his lack of success in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
The coach also maintained that it was unreasonable to expect him to relocate
for a National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) position.
The coach claimed that, although the language in the mitigation clause
defined comparable employment as any NCAA institution, it only meant
employment that was comparable from a monetary, job status, and location
status, not any NCAA job. As such, it was unreasonable to expect the coach
to move. Moreover, the available jobs for which he might be considered for
were low pay compared to the pay he obtained as a professional coach.
The team, of course, countered that the mitigation clause defining
comparability required reasonable steps and good faith to obtain a head coach
or general manager position in the NBA or at an NCAA institution. There was
no particular definition of an NCAA institution so it could have meant, at the
time, any Division I, II, or III institution. The clause did not limit the
obligation to obtain such positions in a particular region or a particular school
or conference, and it was the accepted norm that replacement jobs were not
regional but national in nature. Therefore, it was reasonable to expect the
coach to have to travel or relocate for an available position in the coaching
industry.
The team claimed that the mitigation clause could have actually included
written language that fit the coach’s interpretation of the clause and
restrictions could have been negotiated into the contract. The team further
maintained that there was a litany of NBA coaches who were fired and made it
back into the high college ranks thereafter, many of these top coaches around
the country were in the same age category as the coach after being fired, and
the clause, as drafted, applied to monies payable by the team in the present and
future and did not apply to any amounts previously paid.
The team additionally claimed that the coach’s agents did not negotiate
any of the restrictions related to mitigation in the contract either because they
did not have leverage or because they did not feel it was important. The team
maintained that the coach’s agents could have negotiated restrictions on the
type of NCAA institutions, geographic restrictions, or standards for what was
comparable compensation that would require a good faith effort.
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The word “comparable” was not used in the contract because no
restrictions were negotiated or contained in the contract. The contract did not
limit or restrict the coach’s obligation to mitigate. The team argued that the
coach could refuse to accept any position, but the team must offset the
amounts that he could have earned against the amounts payable by the team.
The coach’s lawyer argued that only amounts that were actually earned, not
the amounts that could have been earned, were to be offset against the amount
payable by the team.
The case involved an interpretation of what the mitigation clause meant in
the first place, whether the coach made a good faith effort to obtain
comparable employment, and what constituted comparable employment.
VII. CONCLUSION—BEST PRACTICES
Mitigation clauses are important in collegiate coaching contracts because
of the high rate of termination without cause and relocation in the coaching
industry. No two termination without cause and mitigation of damages
clauses are exactly alike. These clauses are individually crafted by a coach’s
representatives and university counsel, and there are many variations in the
industry as to the contents thereof.
For instance, two big name coaches in the SEC were recently fired,
University of Tennessee head football coach Derek Dooley and Auburn
University head football coach Gene Chizik.200
The University of Tennessee owes Dooley $5 million in liquidated
damages, or approximately $102,040 per month through December 2016.201
Moreover, Dooley is not required to mitigate damages.202 The money is
guaranteed, meaning that any future employment he may obtain up to and
including December 31, 2016, will not alter what Tennessee is required to pay
him.203
Under his latest contract amendment, Chizik is owed $7.5 million, payable
in equal monthly installments over the remaining duration of the agreement.204

200. Associated Press, Firing a Coach Is Often About Balancing Wins and Losses with Dollars
and Cents, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2012/11/27/firingcoach-is-often-about-balancing-wins-and-losses-with-dollars-and-cents/ [hereinafter Firing a Coach];
Evan Woodbery, Buying out Derek Dooley and Staff Could Cost as Much as $9.3 Million over Four
Years, GO VOLS XTRA (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.govolsxtra.com/news/2012/oct/23/buying-outderek-dooley-and-staff-could-cost-as/.
201. Woodbery, supra note 200.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Chizik Contract, supra note 53, ¶18(b); see also Woodbery, supra note 200.
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But Chizik, unlike Dooley, has a mitigation of damages obligation wherein if
Chizik
[O]btains other employment after his termination or receives
income from any other source (such as for work as an
announcer or analyst, consultant, independent contractor,
speaking engagement fees, income from writing a book, or
appearance fees), the amount earned or received by [Chizik]
will be subtracted from the amount Auburn owes
[him] . . . .205
Chizik “acknowledges that he is required to use reasonable efforts to obtain
other employment[,] . . . income[, or both] from third parties, and he is
required to provide immediate written notice to the University Athletics
Director of such earnings or income . . . .”206 Obviously, market leverage
would result in no obligation to mitigate and an agreed upon lump sum or
installment payment as liquidated damages. It is where one is required to
mitigate where issues start to arise.
In carefully reviewing the industry standard relative to what constitutes a
mitigation of damages clause and experiencing the implementation and
interpretation of such a clause first-hand as an expert witness, some
conclusions can be reached as to best practices relative to the drafting of
mitigation of damages clauses in coaches’ contracts:
1. The contract should clearly state that the coach has an affirmative
obligation to mitigate damages; that the right to receive liquidated
damages, as specified in the termination without cause clause, is
specifically conditioned on meeting and fulfilling that obligation;
and that liquidated damages are not guaranteed payments.
2. The obligation to mitigate damages requires a reasonable, diligent,
and good faith effort. These words are not easily definable, are
words of art, and should have a more substantive definition as to
their meaning. For instance, when does the obligation to mitigate
commence? Is it immediate or does the coach get some “rest
period” after termination? Is the coach, in order to meet the
mitigation obligation, required to have some form of marketing
plan? Is the coach required to maintain a “book” or time log with
respect to prospective job inquiries? Is the coach required to have
a list of targets based on job availability? Are written follow-ups
required to initial inquiries? A best practice clause will require

205. Chizik Contract, supra note 53, ¶18(b).
206. Id.
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specificity and definition as to what constitutes reasonable,
diligent, and good faith efforts to mitigate damages.
3. The obligation to mitigate requires a good faith effort to obtain
comparable employment. Comparable employment is another
term that needs to be specifically defined. Does comparable
employment mean identical or similar job status, responsibilities,
and compensation? Does comparable employment mean that a
head coach who was terminated without cause from an SEC job
paying four million dollars a year must take employment as a head
coach in the Atlantic Coast Conference at two million dollars a
year if available? Does comparable employment mean another
coaching job at the same division level or any coaching job at any
level in the NCAA? Does comparable employment mean a
similar job in a professional status as either a head coach or
assistant head coach? Does comparable employment mean an
administrative job such as a general manager, athletic director, or
front office staff? Does comparable employment mean income
from media outlet employment or other sports-related
employment, or does comparable employment mean income from
any source regardless of the job description? The obligation is to
make the coach whole for the liquidated damage amount, and the
responsibility to pay any difference is always with the university.
Maybe comparable employment ought to define an accepted
minimum compensation package that offsets the university’s
obligation rather than attempting a definition of comparable job
status, responsibilities, and compensation.
4. Because the college coaching market is national in nature, a good
faith and reasonable effort to obtain comparable employment
includes available coaching jobs on a national basis. That would
appear to be the most reasonable and understood meaning within
the industry. However, coaches oftentimes are not interested in
moving, want to stay within the same or similar conference, want
comparable employment to include designated schools, and want
to put some form of geographic limitation on movement. All of
this must be written into the contract to further define what
comparable employment is.
5. While the intent of mitigation of damages clauses is to make the
coach whole during the mitigation period, what offsets liquidated
damages also needs to be specifically defined. Does it include
salary, benefits, deferred compensation, personal service and
talent fees, income from outside sources, perquisites, bonuses, and
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other forms of compensation that may constitute the package? Or
should the offset be defined as anything that has economic value
that is paid by the subsequent employer?
6. Most mitigation of damages clauses have some form of reporting
function, which is a certification of the amounts that the coach has
received at the new employment to offset the university’s
responsibility. The reporting function and how one certifies
actually what is received to offset liquidated damages must be
more specific in detail.
7. Finally, if employment is obtained in contemplation of the
obligation to mitigate in a reasonable, diligent, and good faith
manner, is the offsetting compensation received by virtue of new
employment prospective or retroactive in nature and application?
My experience as an expert witness was telling with respect to the drafting
deficiencies in these clauses and how much is left up to guesswork and
interpretation.207
A well-drafted mitigation of damages clause will
contemplate the specific items that I encountered as an expert witness and the
questions that I have raised in this Section.
VIII. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
Termination and early firing are part of the coaching job landscape. The
back end of the contract may be as important as the front end. Therefore,
time, thought, and good draftsmanship must be given to termination clauses,
especially termination without cause, which are simply means of continued
payment. The problems inherent in a mitigation of damages clause are too
many to anticipate.
Bill Carr, former athletic director of the University of Florida and
University Houston, has stated:
[I]t’s best to identify a number to pay for liquidated damages
rather than trying to determine coaching related compensation
in the dismissed coach’s new circumstances. The amount of
time and effort required to report and verify becomes
prohibitive for both parties.
Today’s coaches’ compensation is so extreme, it’s hard for a
university not to insist on some reduction of the buyout total,
and that has to be more than just current value calculations.
Prospectively, the coach is likely to earn some money from

207. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
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coaching related sources; that amount should be factored in to
achieve a fair number for liquidated damages.208
Coaches, career, and contract consultant Thom Park has also stated:
Having participated with the coaching profession as an
advocate, a business and career advisor for three decades, I
have watched the escalation of coaching compensation in this
highly insecure and transient vocation. Institutional cost
liability for coaches terminated ‘not for cause’ has led to the
use of mitigation language in coaches contracts. The
employer’s hope here is that the terminated coach will find
new employment soon and reduce the former employer’s cost
in the liquidated damage settlement by offsetting that cost
with what is earned in the future. The fact is that similar
paying employment circumstances in such a highly
competitive arena are seldom found and certainly not quickly,
if at all. The terminated coach may also well need time off to
simply re-energize and heal psychologically. Given the
financial cost of the legal labor over any conflict in the
mitigation details, mitigations financial incentive to the coach
to avoid a quick reentry to the coaching ranks, and the
intrusiveness of the sports news with possible negative
institutional public relations, an optimal approach for the
school may well be to simply negotiate a damages settlement
amount and be done with the process. This number could be
paid in a lump sum or installments. When all is calculated, a
negotiated settlement amount devoid of any potential
mitigated claims is cleaner, simpler, and maybe best for the
school.209
The better approach to an early terminated coach is simply a negotiated
amount as liquidated damages, which is paid either in lump sum or tax
structured pursuant to an agreement between the coach and the university
without any obligation whatsoever to mitigate or find offsetting employment.
The liquidated damages amount should be a number that is negotiated and
defined by the present value of those damages that the coach and the
university agree are to be paid for early termination. Unless a master
draftsman contemplates the many issues that arise with respect to what this
208. E-mail from William Carr, Carr Sports Assocs., Inc., to Author Greenberg (Oct. 30, 2012)
(on file with author).
209. E-mail from Thom Park, Founder and Principal, Thomas Park & Assocs., to Author
Greenberg (Dec. 17, 2012) (on file with author).
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obligation means, a simple no obligation to mitigate whatsoever is the simplest
solution to keep these matters out of the world of arbitration and the courts.
Mike Gundy, Oklahoma State University head football coach, may have
negotiated a reduced amount of liquidated damages for and in consideration of
a waiver of the obligation to mitigate damages. In his contract, he receives
only 75% of his gross base monthly salary and only 75% of the compensation
due under his Talent and Personal Services Contract.210 Said sums are to be
payable in full until paid, but there is no obligation on Gundy’s part to seek
comparable employment as an offset to the amount negotiated as liquidated
damages.211
Not having an obligation to mitigate is worth something, even if the coach
has to take less in the form of liquidated damages as a quid pro quo for having
no obligation to mitigate. It is worth the risk of not having the future
challenge of a failure to meet the obligation.

210. Coaching Contract between Michael R. Gundy and Okla. State Univ. ¶ 8(f) (Jan. 1, 2009)
(on file with author).
211. Id.

